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Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows two trusted parties the ability to exchange a
secret cryptographic key with unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of
quantum mechanics. The transmission and measurement of sequences of quantum bits, or qubits,
between two parties is the underlying mechanism in QKD. Security proofs, theoretically assume
ideal single-photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors.
In practice, imperfections in the state preparation of qubits or those in single-photon
detectors may be exploited to expose security loopholes. A relatively new protocol,
Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD), has been proposed which is immune to
detector side-channel attacks, thus eliminating the need to have trusted single-photon detectors.
However, in MDI-QKD near-perfect state preparation by the two parties is required to prove
security in postprocessing.
This thesis outlines a proof-of-principle demonstration of polarization-encoded MDIQKD using attenuated weak coherent pulses and investigate imperfections to the state
preparation of qubits from certain parameters.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Quantum information science (QIS) is a relatively new field and area of active research
that merges information theory with the laws of quantum mechanics. Exploiting the quantum
properties of light at the single-photon level, information can be encoded into (and extracted
from) the physical states of light.
Cryptography is the study of encoding and decoding information in a manner that is
incomprehensible to third parties. This is usually implemented by the creation of a secret
cryptographic key, which is a set of instructions for encoding and decoding a string of
information. The strength of the encryption is usually proportional to the length of the key. The
amount of information, or bits, stored in a key also influences the security. If a key is used that
has the same length as the plain text, the key is referred to as a ‘one-time pad’. If a one-time pad
is used disposably, it has been proven impossible to decrypt [22]. The key generation process
must be a process that is extremely difficult to guess and therefore usually involves random
numbers. The second condition of traditional cryptography is the requirement that the
transmission, or distribution, of the secret key between parties must be safeguarded from
interception by a third-party. Should an eavesdropper intercept the key, it could potentially be
copied cleanly without evidence of tampering. This was a so-called “key distribution problem”.
Later in the 1970’s, public key distribution became prevalent using encryption algorithms that
were based on complex calculations. The security of the key was reliant upon the length of the
key as well as the difficulty in the computation. [21] In addition, the problem of an eavesdropper
copying the key contents without detection remains.
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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is the practice of two parties exchanging qubits with
the aim of validating the successful transmission of information without tampering. Whereas in
traditional algorithmic cryptography implemented today, such as the NSA’s Secure Hash
Algorithm, the security is dependent upon a computationally intensive mathematical problem
which would require nearly unlimited combinational resources to decrypt. QKD is provably
secure and guaranteed by the well-established laws of quantum mechanics.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard first described a protocol for Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) that has since become known as the BB84 protocol [10]. This was the first such protocol
proposed that could feasibly provide a provably-secure quantum encryption key. From this initial
protocol, many subsequent clever QKD schemes have been proposed and experimentally
implemented. Newer approaches proposed account for vulnerabilities to components (such as
the detectors) of the distribution network. The latest and most promising is the relatively-new
Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI-QKD) protocol. A key distinction of this protocol is
the use of the well-known Hong-Ou-Mandel interference arising from indistinguishable photons
interacting on a 50-50 beam-splitter[2]. Exploiting a time-reversed Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
QKD scheme, Charlie collects Bell-State Measurements on the strings of qubits then broadcasts
the results publicly. Alice and Bob compare entanglement data to their own and verify the
security based on their transmitted qubit data. The advantage over traditional QKD is the
senders/receivers need not assume the measurement devices are secure [2]. Indeed, a necessary
prerequisite for this protocol is near-perfect state preparation on behalf of Alice and Bob.[1] The
following thesis outlines the state preparation optimization, detector characterization, and
technical challenges needed to demonstrate a proof-of-principle MDI-QKD system.
2

A.) Background
The fundamental unit of quantum information processing (QIS) is the qubit,
which is the quantum equivalent of the classical bit. A classical bit is always represented as one
of two states: the |0⟩ and |1⟩ states (or as a 0 and 1). These states may be stored as two distinct
voltage levels on a circuit. The quantum bit can exist as either of these two states, as well as a
superposition of these two states. This superposition can be defined as a unit vector over a twodimensional Hilbert space as:
|𝛹⟩ = 𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩ )

(1.1)

Where the states
|0⟩ = (10), |1⟩ = (01)
Span the Hilbert space H2, which is the computational basis. The values 𝛼 and 𝛽 represent
probability amplitudes in the form of complex numbers and satisfy:
|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 = 1
With |𝛼|2 and |𝛽|2 the probabilities of the qubit to be in either the |0⟩ or |1⟩ state.
The key distinction of qubits from classical bits is that a qubit can take on values of 0, 1, or a
superposition of both. The states |0⟩ and |1⟩ are computational basis states that form an
orthonormal basis for the vector space [9].
We can also write equation 1.1 as:
𝜃
𝜃
|𝛹⟩ = cos ( ) |0⟩ + 𝑒 𝑖𝜑 sin ( ) |1⟩
2
2
3

Where θ and φ define a point on the surface of the Bloch sphere, which is depicted below
in figure 1. All possible qubit states can be represented as a point on the surface of the sphere of
radius 1. Qubits with equal probabilities of being in the |0⟩ or |1⟩ state lie on the equator.
It may appear that an infinite number of states exist on the surface of the Bloch sphere,
however this assumption is incorrect when a measurement is performed on the qubit state. A
measurement of the qubit state collapses the state of the qubit from its superposition of |0⟩ and
|1⟩ to either |0⟩ or |1⟩ in whichever measurement basis it is conducted. This collapse of the
superposition state is a fundamental postulate in quantum mechanics. The result is that a single
measurement leads to a single bit of information of the qubit state. [9]
Using two photons in orthogonal polarization states, we can consider four possible states:
|0,0⟩𝑎𝑏 |0,1⟩𝑎𝑏 |1,0⟩𝑎𝑏 |1,1⟩𝑎𝑏
Now suppose this procedure is carried out for two pure states, |𝛹⟩ and |𝜑⟩.

Figure 1: The Bloch Sphere
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Due to the indistinguishability of photons in the |0,1⟩𝑎𝑏

and |1,0⟩𝑎𝑏 states, there are

only three distinct states that can exist when considering two photons:
|2,0⟩𝑎𝑏

|0,2⟩𝑎𝑏

|1,1⟩𝑎𝑏

B.) The BB84 Protocol
Quantum Key Distribution is a protocol in which the security is proven according to the
fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [16]. Two parties create qubits over a public channel,
which may be not be secure, to produce a private key much like a classical private key. This is
contingent upon the error rate of qubit communication is below a tolerable threshold. The
underlying principle of QKD thus is the fundamental realization that an eavesdropper cannot
acquire information from transmitted qubits without altering each qubit’s state. This can be
proven from two fundamental proofs resulting from the formulation of quantum mechanics: 1)
the no-cloning theorem and 2) gaining information is possible only at the expense of introducing
a disturbance to the measured state [16].
No-Cloning Theorem. Suppose we would like to create a quantum copying machine used
to create an exact copy of an unknown pure quantum state, |𝛹⟩, from a data slot, A. We assign
slot B to be the target slot, to which the state from slot A will be copied. We assume slot B is
also in a pure state, |𝑠⟩. The copy machine’s initial state would be:
|𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝑠⟩
this initial state undergoes a unitary transformation of the form:
𝑈

|𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝑠⟩ → 𝑈(|𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝑠⟩) = |𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝛹⟩
5

𝑈(|𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝑠⟩) = |𝛹⟩ ⊗ |𝛹⟩
𝑈(|𝜑⟩ ⊗ |𝑠⟩) = |𝜑⟩ ⊗ |𝜑⟩

Performing an inner product results in:
⟨𝛹|𝜑⟩ = (⟨𝛹|𝜑⟩)2

this result has two solutions: either |𝛹⟩ = |𝜑⟩ , or |𝛹⟩ is orthogonal to |𝜑⟩. This result means
the copying machine can only clone orthogonal states [16]. Further studies have been performed
questioning the possibility of cloning mix states, allowing imperfect copies tolerable under some
threshold, and non-unitary copying machines [16]. As Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information describes, “even if one allows non-unitary cloning devices, the cloning of nonorthogonal pure states remains impossible unless one is willing to tolerate a finite loss of fidelity
in the copied states. Similar conclusions hold also for mixed states, although a somewhat more
sophisticated approach is necessary to even define what is meant by the notion of
cloning a mixed state” [16]. Thus, Eve cannot intercept the qubit without changing its state.
Information gain implies disturbance. Consider the following proposition: In any
attempt to distinguish between two non-orthogonal quantum states, information gain is only
possible at the expense of introducing a disturbance to the states.
A proof: Allow |𝛹⟩ and |𝜑⟩ to be two non-orthogonal states in which Eve is attempting to
intercept. We assume Eve uses an ancilla prepared in the state |𝑢⟩ to interact unitarily with
either states |𝛹⟩ and |𝜑⟩ to obtain information. We assume the states are undisturbed. For each
case:

6

|𝛹⟩|𝑢⟩ → |𝛹⟩|𝑣⟩
|𝜑⟩|𝑢⟩ → |𝜑⟩|𝑣′⟩

Eve requires |𝑣⟩ and |𝑣′⟩ be different to acquire information about the state. We know inner
products are preserved under unitary operations, such that:

⟨𝑣|𝑣′⟩⟨𝛹|𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝑢|𝑢⟩⟨𝛹|𝜑⟩
⟨𝑣|𝑣′⟩ = ⟨𝑢|𝑢⟩ = 1

This implies |𝑣⟩ and |𝑣′⟩ are identical which also implies distinguishing between |𝛹⟩ and |𝜑⟩
must disturb one of the two states.
This intuitive result is used as a check on transmitted qubit states when Alice and Bob
transmit non-orthogonal qubits. Alice and Bob can establish an upper bound on noise from state
preparation or if any eavesdropping was occurring during qubit exchange. These nonorthogonal
states are inserted randomly into the qubit stream such that the upper bound applies to data qubits
as well. After information reconciliation and privacy amplification they sort a secret key from
the total string.
C.) BB84 Protocol Implementation
Alice uses two conjugate bases (the z and x bases) to send Bob states in one of the following four
prepared states:
|0⟩𝑍 = |0⟩
|1⟩𝑍 = |1⟩
7

|0⟩𝑋 =

|1⟩𝑋 =

1
√2
1
√2

(|0⟩ + |1⟩)

(|0⟩ + |1⟩)

Bob has two measurement bases, the rectilinear and the diagonal. Bob also randomizes
his choice of measurement basis for each incoming pair of photons. After measuring all the
qubits, Alice announces the bases she used for each pair via a classical communication channel.
Only qubits measured in the agreeing basis are considered. This becomes known as the sifted
key.[9] A portion of the sifted key is then compared by Alice and Bob. From the sifted key, and
by comparing with their own known randomized states, each of Alice and Bob can estimate the
rate of errors created during the transmission. If the error rate is higher than a predetermined
threshold, the users abort communication until a secure connection can be established. [9]
In QKD, an eavesdropper is usually referred to as Eve who attempts to measure each pair
of incoming photons. Should Eve measure a qubit, she forces a collapse of the qubit to either the
|0⟩ or |1⟩ state. Eve is not able to make an exact copy of the qubit due to the no cloning
theorem. [9]
Suppose Eve were to intercept an incoming photon. She randomly chooses a
measurement basis. She records the measurement state and resends the state she measures to
Bob. Inevitably evil introduce errors to the sequence of qubits. Suppose Eve chooses the same to
measurement bases as Alice and Bob, about half the time she chooses the correct basis and the
other half incorrect. When Alice chooses the correct basis, there is no measurement error
introduced and all information can be obtained. The other times she chooses the incorrect basis
8

she projects the wrong state to Bob. [9] If Eve intercepts every photon in this way, she obtains
half of the correct information while introducing 25% errors. Alice and Bob will then compare a
significant portion of the transmitted qubits (which will not be used for the key itself) estimate
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). [9] this error rate is the number of incorrectly transmitted
qubits over the total number of trends qubits. Both Alice and Bob can statistically ascertain that
an eavesdropper was present during the transmission. Thus, when an eavesdropper is detected,
Alice and Bob will know the key is compromised and will not be used as their one-time pad.
D.) Quantum Hacking/Security Vulnerabilities
In practical implementation of QKD, the security of communication may contain
vulnerabilities, or side-channels, that could be used to obtain information about the transmitted
key without detection. Recent attacks developed target the imperfections in QKD setups, most
commonly the single-photon detectors themselves. Eve also may attempt to attack the state
preparation devices together some knowledge of the prepared states. However, state preparation
can be under protective supervision without disturbance from an eavesdropper. Another reason
the state preparation is less of a concern is that Alice/Bob can verify their transmitted qubits by
randomly sampling a subset of the distributed key. It is therefore more likely the state
preparation of qubits is well-characterized.
A more common quantum hacking approach is to exploit the detectors’ imbalance in
detection efficiency. One such attack is the detector blinding attack. In this scenario Eve
saturates the receivers single-photon detector such that it no longer distinguishes single-photon
pulses but instead stronger light pulses. Eve could essentially induce detections for each pulse
9

buy shining additional brighter pulses. [20) Other well-known attacks have been documented
such as the photon-number splitting attack and an attack exploiting the dead time of the
detectors. Photon number splitting attacks can occur when state preparation is not attenuated
such that will photons have a reasonable probability of emission in each pulse.
Ideally, fully characterizing all devices to recognize potential side channel attacks is
impractical in a real laboratory setting. [2] another proposed solution is a fully deviceindependent QKD set up which can be proved with Bell State inequality violations. This
approach has been shown to be non-practical due to the need for near unity detection efficiency.
Quantum Bit Error Rate. The quantum bit error rate is defined simply as the ratio of
wrong bits to the total number of transmitted bits. Converting from total number to a rate per unit
time, it is explicitly:
𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 =

𝑁𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑅𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
=
≈
𝑁𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝑁𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡

Where Rsift or the bits in which Alice and Bob had the same basis choice. On average this is
about one half therefore, the sifted key rate is half that of the raw key rate. The Rocky rate is the
pulse repetition rate multiplied by the photon number for pulse times the probability of success
or arrival to the detector times the probability a photon being detected (quantum efficiency).
1
1
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡 = 𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤 = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝 ∙ 𝜇 ∙ 𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∙ 𝜂
2
2

The factor q is introduced to correct for non-interfering combinations in phase coding systems.
Their contributions to the error rate: the first is due to photons arriving at the wrong detector, the
10

second arises from dark counts detector, and the third arising from uncorrelated photons due to
imperfect sources.
1
𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝 ∙ 𝜇 ∙ 𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∙ 𝜂 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡
2
𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡 =
𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑐 =

11
∙𝑓 ∙𝑝
∙𝑛
2 2 𝑟𝑒𝑝 𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘

11
∙𝑓 ∙𝑝 ∙𝑡
∙𝑛∙𝜂
2 2 𝑟𝑒𝑝 𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘

The full QBER is now expressed as:
𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 =

= 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡 +

𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑐
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡

𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘 ∙ 𝑛
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑐
+
𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∙ 𝑛 ∙ 2 ∙ 𝑞 ∙ 𝜇 2 ∙ 𝑞 ∙ 𝜇

= 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡 + 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑐
E.) Measurement-Device-Independent QKD
Although in principle, QKD is provably secure via statistical analysis based on the laws
of quantum mechanics. [12] Statistically, the well-established laws of quantum mechanics
manifests itself in the probabilistic outcomes of qubit measurements. But as is the case with
realistic detectors and state preparation devices, real-world measurements do not completely
comply with the theoretical predictions [10]. This lead to the development of attack schemes
capitalizing on the imperfections of single-photon detectors, (SPDs) in particular [10]. Some
groups have developed protocols which counteract these vulnerabilities in SPDs from detector
side-channel attacks [2]. The first such protocol is known as Measurement-Device-Independent
11

QKD (MDI-QKD). This protocol is a modification of a time-reversed entanglement-based QKD
[12].
In the proposed MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob each send polarized, attenuated laser
pulses to a third party, Charlie, who may or may not be a trusted party. The two have agreed to
prepare their qubits in one of the four BBB84 polarization states. One measurement basis is
defined by the polarizing axes of Charlie’s polarizing beam-splitter (PBS). The two orthogonal
states in this basis are aligned with Charlie’s PBS outputs. In the second basis, they agree upon a
third polarization state, referred to as the diagonal state. Alice and Bob must align their diagonal
polarization before the randomized qubits are transmitted. Special consideration needs to be
taken to align the diagonal basis such that HOM interference occurs at the 50-50 beam-splitter.
They now send Charlie a randomized sequence of the three polarizations to the input
ports of his 50-50 beam-splitter. Charlie then has one of the outputs of the 50-50 BS sent to the
input of his PBS. The outputs of the PBS (H and V) are sent to his two single-photon-detectors.
Charlie performs Bell State Measurements (BSMs) using coincident events between his two
detectors (within a certain time window). Charlie subsequently announces his BSM results
publicly to Alice and Bob, who combine this information with their known, randomly-encoded
polarization states to correlate the results. [2]
The underlying principle is based upon the time-reversed EPR-based QKD protocol [1].
Charlie is broadcasting entanglement events that occurred at the 50-50 beam-splitter. Since Alice
and Bob can verify the entanglement events, the presence of an eavesdropper with complete
control of the detection devices is inconsequential for this protocol [1]. Information about the
key cannot be reconstructed without knowing the polarization states of Alice and Bob. [1]
12

Therefore, in this scheme, knowledge of the measurement devices is unnecessary, as well as the
need to trust the security of the measurement devices. This proves reliably more secure over
other QKD protocols [2].
Quantum Bit Error Rate in MDI-QKD. Modelling the errors: an implementation of
MDI-QKD may involve various error sources such as the mode mismatch resulting in a nonperfect Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference. An important question to answer is how much the
mismatch incoming photon pairs affects modes of MDI-QKD [5]. This leads to further
investigations into the origin of the error rate. The purity of the state preparation must be
characterized as well as the detector parameters. In most QKD setups, weak coherent pulses used
in which single-photon contributions are estimated by the decoy-state protocol[2]. There is also
limitation that QKD experiments are run in a fixed time, meaning the output key length is finite.
This leads to the estimation of relevant parameters that suffer from statistical fluctuations[2].
This is the origin of the finite key effect[19]. Thus, a finite key analysis must be performed.
From Kwong, Curty, et al. , their findings indicate polarization misalignment is the major source
contributing to the QBER and mode mismatch.
The error bit rate in the rectilinear basis
𝐸𝑍 =

𝐶𝐻𝐻 + 𝐶𝑉𝑉
𝐶𝐻𝐻 + 𝐶𝑉𝑉 + 𝐶𝐻𝑉 + 𝐶𝑉𝐻

And the rate in the diagonal basis:
𝐸𝑋 =

−
+
+
𝐶−
𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐷𝐴 + 𝐶𝐴𝐷
𝐶𝐷𝐷 + 𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐷𝐴 + 𝐶𝐴𝐷

13

−
Where Ez is the QBER of Z- and Ex the QBER of X- basis. 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶+
𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is the coincidence

count rate associated with |𝛹 ± ⟩ and the ij subscripts are the encoding polarization states of Alice
and Bob. Theoretical QBER for the Z-basis is 0% while for the X-basis, the expected rate is
25%.
Since weak coherent pulses are Poisson-distributed, the probability of two photons being
sent by Alice as a vacuum pulses semi-Bob is half the probability of a single-photon being
emitted simultaneously by each [19 qte]. This property of WCPs manifests itself in the diagonal
basis causing 25% of |𝛹 − ⟩ events to occur when their polarizations are identical and 25% of
|𝛹 + ⟩ events to occur when sending orthogonal polarizations. For identical polarization states
(DD), 75% of |𝛹 + ⟩ events should occur while for the orthogonal states (AD), 25% of |𝛹 + ⟩
events should occur.
F.) The Hong-Ou-Mandel Interference
The interaction to consider is the input and output states of photons upon a 50/50
beamsplitter, depicted in Figure 2. Let the operators 𝑎 + , 𝑏 + , 𝑐 + , 𝑑 + represent the creation of
single photons in their respective ports. When two photons are incident in the two input ports (a
and b), the beam-splitter input state can be written as:
|𝑖𝑛⟩ = 𝑎+ 𝑏 + |0,0⟩ = |1,1⟩𝑎𝑏
Where |0,0⟩ is the two-photon vacuum state for perfectly identical photons. A unitary
, symmetric beam splitter transformation can be described mathematically as:
𝐵=

1

1 𝑖
]
√2 𝑖 1
[

14

Figure 2: Bell State Measurement configuration with a 50/50 Beam-splitter and
Polarizing Beam-splitter

After applying the beam-splitter transformation to this input state we have:
𝑐 + + 𝑖𝑑 + 𝑖𝑐 + − 𝑑 +
|𝑜𝑢𝑡⟩ = (
)(
) |0,0⟩𝑐𝑑
√2
√2
=

1 +
(𝑐 + 𝑖𝑑 + )(𝑖𝑐 + + 𝑑 + ) |0,0⟩𝑐𝑑
2
=

𝑖 + +
(𝑐 𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝑑 + ) |0,0⟩𝑐𝑑
2

=

𝑖
(|2,0⟩𝑐𝑑 + |0,2⟩𝑐𝑑 )
2

This indicates that the two photons will both appear in output port c or d. The cases where the
photons each are reflected or transmitted are indistinguishable and, therefore, not observed. [11]
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If we were to measure the coincident counts from the output of the beam-splitter with
completely distinguishable photons, a certain coincident count-rate would be observed. This
value would represent the case of minimally-entangled photons and, therefore, our maximum
coincident count-rate. As the polarization state of the two incident photons become more
indistinguishable, the coincident count-rate would drop and approach approximately the limit of
one half of the original coincident count rate. When plotting the coincident count-rate as a
function of polarization angle, we can see the well-known HOM dip first observed by Hong, Ou,
and Mandel [11]. This effect is critical for the MDI-QKD protocol, since coincident events are
dependent upon the projection onto the |𝛹 + ⟩ state.
G.) Bell-State Measurements
The Bell basis consists of four maximally entangled states. For rectilinear polarization,
these states can be expressed as:
|ψ± ⟩𝑉 =

|Φ± ⟩𝑉 =

1
√2
1
√2

(|0⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 ± |1⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 )

(|0⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 ± |1⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 )

Figure 3 depicts the configuration required a Bell State Measurement. HOM interference occurs
at the first beam-splitter and thus the photons exit the same port. A coincidence detection on the
detectors D1H and D1V indicate a successful projection to the |𝛹 + ⟩ state. For our setup,
perform partial BSMs as the |𝛹 + ⟩ state is the only projection state we measure from the outputs
of a single PBS.
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To measure the outcome probabilities in different bases, a rotation of the polarization state
functions is needed. For example, the following state
|∗⟩𝑋 = 𝛼|0⟩𝑋 + 𝛽|1⟩𝑋
in basis X. We wish to express this state and the basisY, or |∗⟩𝑌 .
Defining X and Y as:
𝑋 = {|0⟩𝑋 , |1⟩𝑋 }
𝑌 = {|0⟩𝑌 , |1⟩𝑌 }
For a rotation through an angle θ, the transformation from X to Y can be the be written as:
[

cos 𝜃
− sin 𝜃

𝛼
𝛾
sin 𝜃
] [ ] = [ ]
cos 𝜃 𝑋,𝑌 𝛽 𝑋
𝛿 𝑌

And for
|∗⟩𝑌 = 𝛾|0⟩𝑌 + 𝛿|1⟩𝑌
Now we can write |∗⟩𝑋 in the Y basis as:
|∗⟩𝑋 = (𝛼 cos 𝜃 + 𝛽 sin 𝜃)|0⟩𝑌
+ (𝛽 cos 𝜃 − 𝛼 sin 𝜃)|1⟩𝑌
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Figure 3: Experimental set-up of the HOM interference investigations.

Defining the Rectilinear basis ⊕ , and the Diagonal basis ⊗ :
⊕= {|𝐻⟩, |𝑉⟩}
⊗= {|𝐷⟩, |𝐴⟩}
Where |𝐷⟩ = |45°⟩ and |𝐴⟩ = |135°⟩. To make a measurement in the rectilinear basis ⊕ from a
diagonal state, we set θ = - 𝜋/4 and:
−𝜋
−𝜋
) |𝐻⟩ − sin ( )| 𝑉⟩
4
4

|𝐷⟩ = cos (

=

1
√2

(|𝐻⟩ + |𝑉⟩ )
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Now we look at a two-photon state |𝐷⟩|𝐴⟩ which is not entangled, and express it in the ⊕ basis:
|𝐷⟩|𝐴⟩ = [
=

1
√2

(|𝐻⟩ + |𝑉⟩ )] [

1
√2

(−|𝐻⟩ + |𝑉⟩ )]

1
(−|𝐻⟩|𝐻⟩ + |𝐻⟩|𝑉⟩ − |𝑉⟩|𝐻⟩ + |𝑉|𝑉⟩)
2

This expression indicates an equal probability of being measured in each of the four possible
two-photon states in the ⊕ basis.
We can similarly define a transformation matrix for the two-photon states in the X basis
to the Y basis. Defining W and V:
V = {|0⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 , |0⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 , |1⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 , |1⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 }
W = {|0⟩𝑌 |0⟩𝑌 , |0⟩𝑌 |1⟩𝑌 , |1⟩𝑌 |0⟩𝑌 , |1⟩𝑌 |1⟩𝑌 }
the transformation matrix becomes:

[𝑇]V,W

𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃
= [−𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
−𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃

𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃
−𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃
−𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃

𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
−𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃
𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃
−𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃

𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 ]
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃

Now, we are interested in the maximally-entangled Bell states in the V basis
|Φ± ⟩𝑉 =

|ψ± ⟩𝑉 =

1
√2
1
√2

(|0⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 ± |1⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 )

(|0⟩𝑋 |1⟩𝑋 ± |1⟩𝑋 |0⟩𝑋 )

Written in vector form, the states |ψ+ ⟩𝑉 , |ψ− ⟩𝑉 , |Φ+ ⟩𝑉 , and |Φ− ⟩𝑉 become:
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|ψ+ ⟩𝑉 =

1
√2

0
1
[ ]
1
0 𝑉

|ψ− ⟩𝑉 =

1
√2

0
1
1
[ ] |Φ+ ⟩𝑉 =
√2
−1
0 𝑉

1
1
1
0
0
[ ] |Φ− ⟩𝑉 =
[ ]
√2
0
0
1 𝑉
−1 𝑉

Projecting the W basis results in:
1
√2

0
2𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
0
𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃 − 𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃
2
2
1
1 𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝜃 − 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝜃
1
1
1
[ ] ,
[ −2𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 ] ,
[
]
2
2 ] , √2 [
√2
√2
1
−1
𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜃
−
𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝜃
−2𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
0 𝑊
−2𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 𝑊
0 𝑊
𝑠𝑖𝑛2 𝜃 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 𝜃 𝑊

To find the probability of each outcome, we square the above vectors. We are most interested in
measuring a diagonally encoded Bell state in the ⊕= {|𝐻⟩, |𝑉⟩} basis, with θ = - 𝜋/4
|Φ+ ⟩⊗ =

1
√2

1
0
[ ]
0
1 ⊕

|Φ− ⟩⊗ =

1
√2

0
−1
0
1
1
1
1
0
[ ] |ψ+ ⟩⊗ =
[ ] |ψ− ⟩⊗ =
[ ]
√2
√2
1
−1
0
0 ⊕
1 ⊕
0 ⊕

The last two are most relevant for our setup, especially the third. Since we are measuring in the
rectilinear basis (defined by Charlie’s polarization beam-splitter), we are interested in the result
of measuring |ψ+ ⟩⊗ in Charlie’s basis. Qubits initially in the |ψ+ ⟩⊗ state will exit the same port
of the first 50-50 beam-splitter, due to the HOM interference, and both be diagonal to Charlie’s
measurement basis. Therefore, the coincident event would occur between Charlie’s two
detectors.
Four Cases of the Bell State Measurement (BSM). The four measurement cases for projections
of the input states to the measurement basis of the single-photon detectors are described
individually in the following four cases.
Case 1: Alice and Bob send identical polarizations in the rectilinear basis

20

Due to the HOM effect, incident identical photons exit through the same output port of
the 50/50 Beam-Splitter(BS) and into the input port of the Polarizing Beam-Splitter (PBS). The
result is non-detection between detectors D1H and D1V since the photons have identical
polarizations (H or V). [6]
Case 2: Alice and Bob send Orthogonal polarizations in the rectilinear basis
In this case, the photon pairs exit the same output port of the 50/50 BS randomly onefourth of the time. These photons will then be directed to the PBS where a coincidence detection
would be detected due to the orthogonality of the photons. This results in a successful Bell-State
Measurement (BSM) of the |𝛹 + ⟩ state. [6]
Case 3: Alice and Bob send identical polarizations in the diagonal basis
If the incident photons have identical polarizations in the diagonal basis, the photons will
exit the same port of the 50/50 BS via the HOM interference. At the PBS, there is now a 50%
probability the two photons will collapse to orthogonal |𝐻⟩ , |𝑉⟩ states and a 50% probability of
collapsing to identical polarization states. In this scenario, a successful BSM of the |𝛹 + ⟩ state
occurs for half of incident photon pairs. [6]
Case 4: Alice and Bob send orthogonal polarizations in the diagonal basis
In this scenario, just as in case 2 above, the photons exit the same port of the 50/50 BS randomly.
At the PBS, coincident detections are made, however, the results lead to indistinguishable
results.
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Chapter 2: Experimental setups
In this section, two experimental setups are described. The first setup was configured for
investigations of the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference and the effects of certain parameters
on the HOM visibility. The other experimental layout was used to demonstrate a proof-ofprinciple MDI-QKD using weak coherent pulses (WCPs).
A.) Experimental Instruments and Components
I begin with a brief overview of instruments used in each experiment depicted in figure 4
and figure 5. signal generators, single-photon avalanche detectors, and optical components.
The ID210 Single-Photon Avalanche Detector from Idquantique is the model used for all
experiments presented here. Photodiodes are essentially photodetectors that convert detected
photons into current signals. Avalanche photodiodes is composed of a semiconductor device
capable of triggering avalanche multiplication utilizing the photo-electric effect. By setting a
high reverse bias voltage, a current gain effect occurs internally due to the ionization caused
from impinging photons. Commonly known as the avalanche effect. A higher gain is a result of a
higher reverse voltage in most cases. For typical APDs, the reverse voltage is set below the
breakdown voltage which prevents it from detecting individual photons. Our detector, the ID210
from Idquantique, is a “solid-state photodetector based on a reverse biased p-n junction in which
a photo-generated carrier can trigger an avalanche correct due to the impact idolization
mechanism.” [21] An SPAD is like an APD in that it relies on an avalanche current (phototriggered) of a reverse biased p-n junction to detect photons. The key distinction from APDs is
that SPADs are designed to operate with a reverse bias below the breakdown voltage. [21]
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Typically, the APD has a bias voltage above the breakdown voltage until a primary charge
carrier is created. This is a meta-stable state in which a charge carrier causes the amplification to
essentially become infinite such that the absorption of a single-photon causes a current pulse
which can be detected by internal electronic circuitry. This current can damage the device if the
current flowing is not quenched to reset the device. After specific time has elapsed, the bias
voltage returns to its initial level above the breakdown voltage. The time that lapses between the
quenching and the restoration is referred to as the dead-time. [21]
The efficiency of the SPAD is defined as the probability of detecting a photon that
impinges on the photodiode. Two factors played into the probability: 1) the probability of photon
reaches the InGaAs layer and 2) the probability a photon-induced primary charge carrier triggers
an avalanche across the multiplication zone. [21] In general the detection efficiency increases
with an increase of the excess bias voltage.
In addition to photons creating avalanches, charge carriers randomly generated from
either thermal fluctuation, tunneling effects, or trapping processes in the junction may trigger an
avalanche as well. These spontaneous events are referred to as dark counts and have an impact
on the quantum efficiency of the detector. [21]
Another limitation to the performance of SPADs is the effect of afterpulsing. This occurs
when charge carriers are trapped inside the high field region during an avalanche event. These
trap charge carriers have a lifetime probability of a few microseconds. The probability of these
events increases dramatically when the dead time is lower the longest lifetimes of trapped
carriers. This value is typically below 5 µs.
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For our experiments, we operated the detectors in gated mode which is when the bias
voltage is set above the breakdown voltage for short time windows or gate windows. Only during
these gate windows, will a detection occur. This operation mode mitigates the effects of spurious
dark counts.
SPAD Detection Rate. Modeling the detector of efficiency, ε, as a virtual beam splitter of
transmittance, ε, and an ideal detector, the detection probability is:
𝑃 = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜀𝑛
Where n= |υ|^2 is the average photon number of the input beam. The average photon number is
the average number of photons per pulse. For a single input arm, no interference occurs, and we
can use Poisson probability distribution. The detection rate of the SPAD is given by:
𝑅𝑑 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝑁𝑔
Where 𝑁𝑔 is the effective gate rate (in Hz). The effective gate rate is the rate of true gates open
for detection. The gating frequency is the rate of gate triggering (1⁄𝑇 ) . The effective gate rate
𝑔

is less than the gating frequency due to the deadtime (~9μs) applied after each detection. We can
write 𝑁𝑔 as:
𝑁𝑔 =

1
𝑇𝑑
− 𝑅𝑑 + 𝑅𝑑
𝑇𝑔
𝑇𝑔

Therefore, the rate of detection becomes:
𝑅𝑑 = (1 − 𝑒 −𝜀𝑛 ) ∙ (

And we can solve for the average photon number:
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1
𝑇𝑑
− 𝑅𝑑 + 𝑅𝑑 )
𝑇𝑔
𝑇𝑔

𝑛 = |𝜐|2 =

1 − 𝑅𝑑 𝑇𝑑 + 𝑅𝑑 𝑇𝑔
1
ln (
)
𝜀
1 − 𝑅𝑑 𝑇𝑑

For our ID 210 SPADs, the efficiency setting we chose for all measurements was 10%. Of
course, the true efficiency could differ slightly from this value.
ID Quantique Time-Interval-Analyzer (ID 810). The output of the detection signals from the
ID210s are sent to a time interval analyzer. This device records incoming signals and assigns
time tags for triggered events with resolution of 81ps. Each event is given a specific time tag
recorded in integer bin numbers, each of bin size equal to 81ps. Software is included with the
device enabling real-time plotting of detection rates, coincident events, data logging, as well as
creating histograms. This device can be interfaced via a USB connection, which allows for
command line control. A typical file output produces two columns the first of which logs events
according to bin number and the second column with the input channel number.
Keysight Arbitrary Waveform Generator 33622A. The arbitrary waveform generator (AWG)
used for modulating the polarization state in the Pol-M configuration was synchronized with the
delay generator pulses at the phase modulator. Any waveform shape can be uploaded as well as
several preset functions. For remote control, a basic model designed for Matlab’s instrument
control toolbox was modified from the basic version for full command-line functionality.
Stanford Research Systems Digital Delay Generator (DG645) – ‘SRS’. This instrument
generates the electronic modulation for the IM which produces the WCPs. It also provides the
synchronous clock rate for all the major modulator signals and detection triggering. It is also our
triggering signal for detection gates and synchronizing pulse events between instruments. The
resolution of better than 10ps provides fine adjustment of pulse arrival times and shape profile
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B.) Experimental Layout
We begin with a CW laser source (Clarity NLL-1550-LP) frequency-locked at 1550nm.
A signal delay generator (Stanford Research Systems Digital Delay Generator DG645) sends
electrical pulses at ~2ns FWHM to a LiNbO3-based intensity modulator to produce weak
coherent pulses at 1MHz. The output of which is directed to the polarization modulator (Pol-M)
configuration which includes an optical circulator, phase modulator, and Faraday mirror. (The
functionality of the polarization modulator is described in a subsequent section with a schematic
diagram.) The output from the polarization modulator is sent to a second optical circulator
which outputs the beam from the second output to the free space channel. The free-space channel
consists of a collimating optical lens from the circulator and a 99% reflecting mirror which
directs the beam back into the collimating lens to fiber-couple the light and through the third
output of the optical circulator. The third output of this circulator is first sent to a manual
variable attenuator for course attenuation, then subsequently a digital variable attenuator for fine
attenuation control. The output of this attenuator is sent to a single-mode 50/50 beam-splitter.
Each beam-splitter output pigtail is then connected to each of the two single photon detectors.
The schematic of this setup is depicted in figure 3.
Polarization controller paddles (PCs) are placed before input 1 of the first circulator to
deliver optical pulses into the phase modulator of the Pol-M at 45° polarization relative to the
phase modulator’s optical axis of maxima modulation (the slow-axis of the fiber). The phase
modulator within the Pol-M schematic is modulated by an arbitrary waveform generator (Agilent
33622A) with electrical pulses of approximately 20ns at 1MHz. Electrical pulses from the AWG
are matched in phase to the optical pulse with unattenuated light using an oscilloscope. The
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instruments are matched in phase to the optical pulse with unattenuated light using an
oscilloscope. The instruments are matched to the 10 MHz signal generated by the SRS delay
generator. The SRS maintains a single clock rate for all instruments.
After the optical pulses and modulating pulses are synchronized, the intensity in each arm
is first attenuated coarsely with the manual variable optical attenuator (VOA) to single-photon
attenuation. We added an additional digital attenuator to fine-tune the detector count-rate (and
photon number). The next step in the procedure is to synchronize the gating windows of the
SPADs with the attenuated optical pulses. The SRS delay generator is used to send the gating
signal to the SPADs with electrical pulses of 10ns width at 1MHz.
Initially, we had used the ‘external triggering’ setting for the SPADs, which left control
of the gating window size to the SPAD electronics. We found the gating windows for each
SPAD to be inconsistent with the user interface settings. We then transitioned to using the ‘free
gating’ option, which allowed us to control the gating window size directly using the SRS.
The gating functionality of the SPADs is preferred to limit the effects of dark counts. [21] A
dead time of 10µs is used to limit the effects of after-pulsing in the SPADs.
Initially, we had used the ‘external triggering’ setting for the SPADs, which left control
of the gating window size to the SPAD electronics. We found the gating windows for each
SPAD to be inconsistent with the user interface settings. We then transitioned to using the ‘free
gating’ option, which allowed us to control the gating window size directly using the SRS.
The gating functionality of the SPADs is preferred to limit the effects of dark counts. [21] A
dead time of 10µs is used to limit the effects of after-pulsing in the SPADs.
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C.) Polarization Encoding via the Polarization Modulator (Pol-M)
In QKD, it is necessary to control the output states of the photons rapidly and in a
controlled, predictable manner. The polarization encoding mechanism is a crucial component in
MDI-QKD for delivering precise polarization orientations for both Alice and Bob. For instance,
in the two-photon diagonal polarization state |𝐷⟩|𝐷⟩ , both Alice and Bob must align their
diagonal polarization states well enough to have consistent HOM interference on the 50-50
beam-splitter. This effect produces detectable photon pairs at Charlie’s PBS, which is a
successful BSM measurement of the |𝛹 + ⟩ projection. This modulation must also be at the
repetition rate of 1 MHz. Figure 4 depicts the polarization modulation scheme, Pol-M.
For the input to the phase modulator, we require the polarization angle to be 45° to the TE axis
of the waveguide in the PM. We connect a PBS to output 2 of the circulator and use a
polarization controller (PC) to adjust the polarization such that the PBS output intensities are
equal. Input pulses pass through the PM and are reflected by the Faraday Mirror where they
undergo a 90° rotation in polarization. They travel back through the PM and out port three of the
circulator. An electrical pulse is applied to the PM that is synchronized with the optical pulse.
In the waveguide, the TE and TM modes have differing modulation parameters for a given
applied voltage. This creates a net phase difference between the TE and TM modes. The output
state can be written as:
|𝛹⟩ =

|𝑇𝐸⟩ + 𝑒 𝑖𝛹 |𝑇𝑀⟩
√2

where Ψ is the phase difference added along the TE and TM directions [4]. Polarization states
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Figure 4: Polarization Modulator (Pol-M) schematic. The input is rotated by the first PC to
45° relative to the modulation axis of the phase modulator.

along the TE TM modes are represented by |𝑇𝐸⟩ and |𝑇𝑀⟩. The phase difference Ψ is a function
of the voltage applied to the PM. For our PM (EO Space LiNbO3 Phase Modulator) the Vπ is
3.5V. By varying the peak voltage to the PM, the output polarization can be modulated.
D.) Polarization Modulation Calibration
To set the specific Vpp needed to set the polarization state to a given angle, a calibration
of the Vpp was performed using the configuration in Figure 5.
The SRS sends electrical pulses to the intensity modulator (IM), which produces weak
coherent pulses of width 2 ns at 1 MHz. A DC voltage generator is also connected to the IM to
minimize the background CW intensity. The first polarization controller aligns these pulses to
45° relative to the modulation axis of the phase modulator. An electrical pulse of width 20 ns
from the AWG is sent to the phase modulator and is synchronized with the weak coherent pulse
from the intensity modulator. The SPADs are set two external triggering by the SRS with 10 ns
gate widths. The efficiency is set to 10%. The gates are synchronized with the optical pulses and
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Figure 5 Experimental setup for MDI-QKD
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The DC offset to the intensity modulator is adjusted to minimize photon counts not
attributed to the pulse. We now use the second PC to align the pulses to the vertical PBS pigtail
by adjusting state for a maximum count rate on that detector. We then increment the Vpp in
increments of 0.1V on the AWG by command line argument from Matlab such that the count
rate transitions from the detector 1 transitions to approximately the count rate from detector 2.
E.) Instrument Control and Data Acquisition Integration within Matlab
Early-on in the project, the need to control the various instruments remotely via
command-line input was deemed useful in developing scripts that may automate tasks in state
preparation and/or acquire data from instruments for analysis. I have written in a few instances
where we have sent command-line arguments via Matlab, but here I describe a little further the
extent to which we are able to control our instruments used in state preparation. This would
include data acquisition from the oscilloscope, the timing interval analyzer (TIA), and querying
values from instruments (such as SRS delays, AWG Vpp, digital attenuation levels, etc).
Matlab’s Instrument Control Toolbox is an add-on package included that provides a
seamless integration of instrument control into the workspace. There are several instrument
control I/O APIs that are industry standard for several test and measurement companies. Two of
which were used for our lab equipment specifically, Keysight and Tektronix. Each API has
remote versions with standard libraries for communication over USB, LAN, GPIB, etc. A localarea-network was established in the laboratory to integrate communication with the
Oscilloscope, AWGs, and SRS from a Matlab terminal. The custom API models for the
individual instruments are stored in the shared Google folder. In addition to these, USB
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communication was used for data acquisition from the Thorlabs PM100D energy meter console
and control for an Arduino motor used to block the free-space channels of Alice and Bob
independently.
Several functions for querying and setting specific parameters on the instruments were
developed during this project that I do not mention here. I developed dozens of easy-to-use
functions available for the instruments which could be used for easy scripting to perform certain
routines such as one described below.
Eventually, implementation of a self-stabilizing state preparation feedback control could
provide more continuous operation of key generation. Due to temperature fluctuations and other
instabilities in the fiber, drifts in the polarization on the order of a few minutes to one hour occur.
A feedback loop for monitoring and adjusting the un-modulated polarization state of Alice and
Bob (for maintaining alignment of measurement bases) could provide a more continuous
functionality of key generation.
F.) Technical Challenges
For a truly secure quantum key to be generated, the sequence of random polarization
orientations for Alice and Bob must be calibrated and implemented into our QKD setup. The
polarization orientations of |𝐻⟩, |𝑉⟩, and |𝐷⟩ are modulated by specific peak-to-peak voltages
(Vpp) determined by the calibration procedure described above. Pulse waveforms are generated
by uploading specific pulse shapes to the AWG in memory storage, which require waveforms of
1us in length at 1Gsps. The randomization comes a Matlab random number generating function
to cycle the three waveform shapes 1 to 3, where each coincides to one of the three specific Vpp
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separately for Alice and Bob. The maximum number of randomized pulses able to be uploaded
successfully at the moment is roughly 10,000, using the full sample rate of 1 Gs/s. Other
schemes for implementing the randomization have been proposed though we are exploring a
more efficient data storage scheme for waveform data on the AWG, including reducing sample
rates and utilizing binary as opposed to csv text files.
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Chapter 3: Experimental Results
A.) The Hong-Ou-Mandel Visibility
For the HOM interference setup, we used the SRS to modulate the intensity modulator
with ~4ns pulses which result in ~2ns weak coherent pulses from the IM. The SRS has resolution
of ~10ps such that the leading-edge of pulses can be overlapped accurately with the WCPs from
the other arm. The gating window on the SPADs are synchronized with the WCPs after
matching the arrival times on the 50-50 beam-splitter. The polarization controller of one arm is
adjusted to match the polarization state of the opposing arm. In the TIA software, we set a
coincidence window of ~20ns and plot out coincident events between the detectors. We also
independently match the count rate in each detector from each arm. In Figure 6 we see the wellknown signature HOM dip arising from matching polarization states on the beam-splitter. For
WCPs, maximum HOM interference is indicated by a drop in the coincident event rate to onehalf the count rate of completely distinguishable photons. For Figure 6, the coincident rate
initially is ~825 cts/s then drops to ~410 cts/s. The figure serves as a visual aid when attempting
to match the polarization states. We then record time tag events from the TIA and calculate
quantitatively the coincident probability with HOM interference. This probability theoretically
approaches 0.5 for WCPs. A Matlab script is used to calculate this probability using deadtime,
pulse frequency, and coincidence window input parameters.
Typically, normalized HOM probabilities below 0.55 are reliably achievable.
Approaching a probability of 0.52 involves further fine-tuning of the polarization paddle
positions, but can be done relatively easily and consistently with some scrutiny. Below a
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Figure 6: Signature HOM dip corresponding to a count-rate approaching one-half of
distinguishable photon pair coincidences

probability of 0.52 more challenging and less reliable. However, values below 0.51 have been
achieved on numerous occasions. We suspect the inconsistency of values below 0.51 is due to an
unknown parameter that minimizes the indistinguishability of the incoming photon pairs at the
beam-splitter.
We have also been to achieve HOM probabilities below 0.52 for the |𝐻⟩ and |𝑉⟩
polarization states using the Pol-M configuration independently for Alice and Bob.
B.) Effects of Measurement Device Imperfections on HOM
We investigated the effects of lowering the dead time values on the SPADs on the HOM
probability. We used a pulse rate of 6 MHz for this study. As is shown on the plot in figure 7,
35

each data point is a calculation of the HOM probability versus the deadtime set on the SPAD. At
higher deadtime values (above ~4μs), our HOM probabilities were approximately 0.52. The
exponential rise of the HOM probability is apparent and coincides with an exponential model.
Assuming the afterpulse probability can be fitted with an exponential of the form [22]:
𝑎𝑓𝑡 −𝑏𝑡

𝑃𝑎𝑓𝑡 (𝑡) = 𝑃𝑜

𝑒

Where Po is the afterpulse probability at the minimal deadtime and b the decay constant. Here we
have used Po = 0.005 and b= 0.1, which were determined from an experimental fit. The data in
figure 7 was taken for a 6MHz pulse rate. The decreasing deadtime values set on the SPADs
dramatically lowers the HOM visibility for when all other factors are constrained.

Figure 7: Results of HOM vs Dead-Time at 6MHz. Model depicted in red dashed plot
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C.) Effects of State Preparation Imperfections
Polarization Input states. Using the calibrated voltage to the polarization angle values, figure 8
plots the HOM probability versus polarization angle. The solid curve is predicted behavior. Note
for these data points the HOM visibility approaches 0.52. Modeling the coincident probability
as:

We plot the expected line with calibrated polarization angle values using the Pol-M
configuration described above. Figure 8 plots the results of this expected relationship with the
calibrated polarization state using the Pol-M.
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Figure 8: HOM vs Polarization Angle (calibrated polarization)

D.) Bell State measurements
The plot in Figure9 depicts the coincident count rates for each combination of input
states. The polarization states were altered via command line to the AWG instantaneously. For
each combination of polarization states from Alice and Bob, the coincident count rate
(coincidence window:250bins ~ 20ns). Each polarization state is held constant for 20 seconds,
then altered digitally via command line input to the AWG. The Vpp for each Alice/Bob’s
polarization state is calibrated previously to three specific values corresponding to Vertical,
Horizontal, and Diagonal polarizations. The sequence of polarizations was the following:
AV-BV, AV-BD, AV-BH, AD-BV, AD-BD, AD-BH, AH-BV, AH-BD, AH-BH
where AV = “Alice Vertical”, BD = “Bob Diagonal”, etc.
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The anticipated coincident rates for the prepared states coincide with the expected
probabilities for the given input states. We can see that Alice and Bob have the rectilinear bases
aligned properly and a rotation of polarization from the Pol-M for each result in the anticipated
coincident rate at Charlie’s PBS.

Figure 9: Coincident count- rates for each case of input polarization states
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Further Studies
At this juncture in the experiment, the most immediate obstacle we have is implementing
polarization randomization at 1 MHz repetition in an efficient manner for the AWG. The
challenge is creating a random sequence long enough to create enough coincidences for a
significant quantum bit rate. Currently we can create “slow keys” which are a sequence of
command-line arguments altering the polarization state in 100ms intervals. Each state is then
held constant for 100ms to attain at least one coincidence per state. Furthermore, quantum bit
error rates (QBER) would need to be calculated post-measurement.
At higher rates, a key sifting analysis would need to be performed to correlate detection
events with specific polarization orientations at 1 MHz. This this has proved more challenging
than initially conceived. One proposed solution is to send bursts of a known number of pulses
(and polarization states) that also trigger the triggering of the gates on the detectors. This would
make for easier synchronization of detection events to polarization states. A second solution is to
send marker signals to the TIA at regular intervals that will serve as a clock for the randomized
pulses. At 1 MHz, and with detection efficiency of 10%, we calculate we will have roughly one
coincident detection for every 1,000 pulses. Sharing a significant number of qubits between
Alice and Bob, about 1000 bits, would require 1x106 pulse waveforms. At the time writing, we
first create entire waveform shapes that span 1μs using the full sample rate of 1Gs/s. This means
1x109 data points for each waveform. From the described proposal of 1,000 successful qubit
detections, the files would contain a number samples (and file size) to be efficiently stored as csv
text file on the AWG. Thus, this specific technical hurdle, as well as the sifting needed post
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measurement, is the limiting factor in a creating a true randomized quantum key, using the MDIQKD protocol.
Beyond the full MDI-QKD implementation, we still look towards extending our freespace quantum channel. We currently have limited a free space channel of about 1 m. This is
mostly treated to our limited lab size. Coupling our free space channel over large distances will
require construction of custom telescopes designed for our intended use. Eventually, the effects
of atmospheric dispersion on key generation and bit error rate are intended to be study over
larger free space channels.
Beyond that, a reconfigurable QKD network still needs to be implemented. Intentions
would be to implement a synthesis of our nearly-realized MDI-QKD system with a the more
efficient decoy state BB84 QKD protocol. We would need to investigate implementation of
other decoy states, which are random pulses of a variant photon number, into the encoded pulses.
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